Here I explore a novel no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics which combines aspects of two familiar and well-developed alternatives, Bohmian mechanics and the manyworlds interpretation. Despite reproducing the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics, the theory looks surprisingly classical. All there is at the fundamental level are particles interacting via Newtonian forces. There is no wave function. However, there are many worlds.
In §1, I briefly review why quantum mechanics is in need of a more precise formulation and discuss two promising no-collapse theories: the many-worlds interpretation and Bohmian mechanics. I then go on to offer a rather unlikable variant of Bohmian mechanics which adds to the standard story a multitude of worlds all guided by the same wave function. This theory is useful as a stepping stone on the way to Newtonian QM. Newtonian QM is then introduced. As soon as Newtonian QM is on the table, §4 presents one of the most significant costs associated with the theory: the space of states must be restricted if the theory is to recover the experimental predictions of quantum mechanics. In §5, 6, & 7, I discuss the advantages of this new theory over Everettian (many-worlds) and Bohmian quantum mechanics in explaining the connection between the squared amplitude of the wave function and probability. In §8, I consider the possibility of modifying the theory so that it describes a continuous infinity of worlds instead of a finite collection, concluding that such a modification would be inadvisable. In §9, I propose four options for the fundamental ontology of Newtonian QM. In §10, I discuss the relation of the wave function to the fundamental ontology of Newtonian QM. In §11, I use Newtonian QM to explain the way the wave function transforms under time reversal and Galilean boosts. Spin is discussed in Appendix A.
Some limitations of the theory presented here are worth stating up front. First, I will not discuss extending the theory to handle multiple particles with spin. Second, I focus entirely on non-relativistic quantum physics. Finally, I do not give the fundamental laws for the theory. If the number of worlds is finite, as I propose, then the dynamical law introduced in this article (3.7) is only approximate ( §4).
Newtonian QM is a realist version of quantum mechanics based on the theory's hydrodynamic formulation (originally due to Madelung, 1927) . For recent and relevant discussions of quantum hydrodynamics, see Wyatt (2005) ; Holland (2005) . An approach much like Newtonian QM was independently arrived at by Hall et al. (2014) . Newtonian QM is somewhat similar to Böstrom's (2012) metaworld theory 1 and the proposal in Tipler (2006) . Other ideas about how to remove the wave function are explored in Poirier (2010) ; Schiff & Poirier (2012) , including an intimation of many worlds.
To avoid confusion, throughout the paper I'll use "universe" to denote the entirety of reality, what philosophers call "the actual world" and what in these contexts is sometimes called the "multiverse," reserving "world" for the many worlds of quantum mechanics.
1 The key difference with Newtonian QM being that Böstrom's theory does not as thoroughly excise the wave function (the dynamics being given by (1.1) not (3.7)).
The Measurement Problem
If the state of the universe is given by a wave function and that wave function always evolves in accordance with the Schrödinger equation, then quantum measurements will typically not have single definite outcomes. Actual measurements of quantum systems performed in physics laboratories do seem to yield just one result. This is the measurement problem. There are various ways of responding. One might be tempted to add to the dynamics a rule which says that the wave function sometimes doesn't obey the Schrödinger equation and instead collapses.
Some proposals in this family are promising, but they will not be discussed here. Instead, I will focus on two no-collapse theories which hold that the wave function always obeys the Schrödinger equation.
According to Everettian quantum mechanics, a.k.a. the many-worlds interpretation, the wave function is all there is. The evolution of the wave function is always given by the Schrödinger
.., t) Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) , (1.1)
here written with a fairly general Hamiltonian which allows for a time-dependent external potential as well as interactions between particles. After a measurement occurs, the universal wave function is in a superposition of an observer seeing each possible outcome. This is not to be understood as one observer seeing many outcomes, but as many observers each seeing a single outcome. Thus, the theory is not obviously inconsistent with our experience of measurements appearing to have unique outcomes. According to the theory, people and planets are not built from point-particles but instead are emergent entities who arise as patterns in the universe's wave function. To summarize the theory, here is what the Everettian QM says that there is (the ontology) and how it evolves in time (the dynamical laws). Ontology: (I) universal wave function Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t); Law: (I) Schrödinger equation (1.1).
A second option in responding to the measurement problem is to expand the ontology so that the universe contains both a wave function evolving according to (1.1) and particles with definite locations. The time-dependent position of particle k can be written as #-x k (t) and its velocity as #-v k (t). The wave function pushes particles around by a specified law,
Determinate outcomes of measurements are ensured by the fact that all the particles follow well-defined trajectories through space. This theory is Bohmian mechanics, a.k.a. de BroglieBohm pilot wave theory. Ontology: (I) universal wave function Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t), (II) particles with positions #-x k (t) and velocities #-v k (t); Laws: (I) Schrödinger equation (1.1), (II) guidance
Since the focus of this paper is not on Everettian or Bohmian quantum mechanics, I've sought to present each with a simple ontology. In fact, the best ontology for each theory is a matter of current debate (see e.g., Albert & Ney, 2013) .
From (1.1) and (1.2), one can derive the acceleration of a particle as a function of time,
where Q( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) is the quantum potential, defined by 
Prodigal QM
As a precursor to the theory I'll propose, consider the following interpretation of quantum mechanics which has both a many-worlds and a Bohmian flavor. (Valentini, 2010, §7) . But, less obviously, it turns out that there is another route to simplification:
one can keep the multitude of worlds but remove the wave function. This option will be discussed in the next section.
According to Prodigal QM, the universe contains a wave function Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) on configuration space and a large number of worlds which can be represented as points moving around in configuration space. The arrangement of the worlds in configuration space is described by a 2 With a continuous infinity of worlds, Prodigal QM is mentioned in Valentini (2010, §7) and in Barrett (1999) (in Barrett's terminology, it is a Bohmian many-threads theory in which all of the threads are taken to be completely real); a closely related proposal is discussed in Dorr (2009). smooth number density, ρ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t), normalized so that integrating ρ over all of configuration space gives one,
.., t) over a not-too-small volume of configuration space gives the proportion of all of the worlds that happen to be in that volume at t. By hypothesis, worlds are initially distributed so that
The velocities of the particles in each world are described by a collection of velocity fields indexed by particle number, k,
In Prodigal QM, if there is a world at ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ...) at t the velocity of the kth particle in that
t).
3 With these velocity fields, the equivariance property of the Bohmian guidance equation ensures that ρ is always equal to |Ψ| 2 if it ever is (see Dürr et al. , 1992, §3) .
Ontology: (I) universal wave function Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t), (II) particles in many worlds described by a world density ρ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) and velocity fields #-
The use of densities and velocity fields is familiar from fluid dynamics. A quick review will be helpful. Consider a fluid composed of N point particles which each have mass m. The number density of these particles is n( #-x , t), normalized so that
is m×n( #-x , t). Integrating n( #-x , t) over a not-too-small volume gives the number of particles in that volume at t. Whereas n( #-x , t) gives the density of particles in three dimensional space, ρ
gives the density of worlds in configuration space. The velocity field for the fluid is #-u ( #-x , t), defined as the mean velocity of particles near #-x at t. 5 For an inviscid compressible fluid with zero vorticity, the time evolution of n and #-u are determined by a continuity equation
and a Newtonian force law
where V is the external potential, p is the pressure, and
The acceleration is given by the material derivative of #-u not the partial derivative because a particle's position in the fluid is time dependent.
The three quantum theories on the table thus far are applied to the double-slit experiment in figure 2.1. In the bottom-right diagram is Everettian QM where the universe is just a wave function. The particle's wave function is initially peaked at the two slits and then spreads out and interferes as time progresses. When the particle hits the detector, a multitude of worlds will separate via decoherence and in each the particle will be observed hitting at a particular point on the screen. In Bohmian mechanics, one adds to the wave function an actual particle which follows a definite trajectory in accordance with the guidance equation. In Prodigal QM, there is a wave function and a collection of worlds, each of which contains a particle following a Bohmian trajectory. In Newtonian QM, which will be introduced at the end of §3, one retains the multitude of worlds but removes the wave function.
Removing the Wave Function
Here I will derive an equation for the dynamics of particles in Prodigal QM that makes no reference to the wave function. Once this is done, we can formulate an alternate theory where the dynamics of worlds are the same as in Prodigal QM, but the superfluous wave function has been removed. This new theory, Newtonian QM, will be the focus of the remainder of the article. The mathematical manipulations presented in this section are familiar from discussions of Bohmian mechanics, but take on a different meaning as derivations of particle dynamics in Prodigal QM. Those who wish to skip the derivation should simply note that (3.7) is derivable from (1.1), (2.1), and (2.2).
As ρ = |Ψ| 2 (2.1), the wave function can be written in terms of the world-density and a phase factor as
Plugging (3.1) into the guidance equation (2.2) generates
relating #-v k and θ. (At this point, I will stop repeating the arguments of Ψ, ρ, θ, and #-v k ; they all depend on the configuration of particles and the time.)
The evolution of the wave function Ψ is given by the Schrödinger equation (1.1). Dividing both sides of (1.1) by Ψ and using (3.1), one can derive that Equating the imaginary parts, using (3.2), yields 4) similar to (2.3). This continuity equation follows immediately from interpreting ρ as a density of worlds and #-v k as describing the particle velocities, but it is important to see that it is consistent with, and is derivable from (1.1), (2.1), and (2.2). Equating the real parts of (3.3), using (3.2),
Acting with mj #-∇ j on both sides of (3.5) and rearranging, making use of (3.2) and the fact that
We have derived an equation of motion of the form F = ma, similar to both (1.3) and (2.4).
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The last term in the brackets gives the familiar potential energy of a classical configuration of moving particles and makes no reference to the other worlds. The other term looks like an interaction between the many worlds. This term is the quantum potential Q familiar from Bohmian mechanics (1.4), with |Ψ| replaced by √ ρ. Note that only appears in the quantum potential, the other term is entirely classical.
Within Prodigal QM we have shown that one can derive an equation which determines the dynamics for all of the particles in all of the worlds without ever referencing the wave function.
(3.7) gives a way of calculating the acceleration of a particle that doesn't mention Ψ, as (2.2) does, but only depends on the density of worlds and the potential V . In Prodigal QM, this equation
is derived, not a fundamental law. But, what if we took it to be the fundamental equation of motion? One can remove the wave function from Prodigal QM leaving only the corresponding ρ and #-v k s. So long as one enforces (3.7), the dynamics for particles will be essentially as they were in Prodigal QM.
Now we can formulate a new theory: Newtonian QM. Reality consists of a large but finite number of worlds whose distribution in configuration space is described by ρ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t). The velocities of the particles in the worlds are described by the velocity fields
t).
The dynamical law for the velocity fields is the double-boxed equation of motion for the theory, (3.7), a Newtonian force law. As the particles move, the resultant shift in the distribution ρ is determined by (3.4). According to Newtonian QM, quantum mechanics is nothing but the Newtonian mechanics of particles in many different worlds. Ontology: (I) particles in many worlds described by a world density ρ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) and velocity fields #-v k ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t); Law:
(I) Newtonian force law (3.7).
Comparing this statement of Newtonian QM to the formulation of Bohmian mechanics in §1,
Newtonian QM is arguably the simpler theory. The theory has a single dynamical law and the fundamental ontology consists only of particles.
Non-quantum States
In this section I will discuss two ways in which histories of the universe which obey the equation of motion for Newtonian QM might fail to exhibit familiar quantum mechanical behavior. First, the finite collection of worlds may not be well-described as a continuum. Second, even if the continuum approximation is justified, the velocity fields might not allow the introduction of a phase which satisfies (3.2).
Since the number of worlds is taken to be finite, the actual distribution of worlds will be highly discontinuous; some locations in configuration space will contain worlds and others will not. Still, we can use a smooth density function ρ to describe the distribution of worlds well enough at a coarse-grained level (see footnote 5). The velocity field #-v k ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ...) gives the mean velocity of the k-th particle in worlds near ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ...), but the k-th particle in a world
worlds will typically only approximately follow Bohmian trajectories through configuration space just as fluid particles do not exactly follow pathlines.
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In fluid dynamics, the use of a description of the fluid in terms of n and #-u is justified by the fact that we can calculate the dynamics of these coarse-grained properties (and others) without needing to know exactly what all the particles are doing. After all, it is the coarse-grained properties that we measure (Batchelor, 1967, §1.2; Chapman & Cowling, 1970, §5) . What justifies the use of ρ and the #-v k s to describe the collection of worlds? As it turns out, we can calculate the dynamics of these properties without worrying about the exact locations of worlds via (3.4) and (3.7). Once the evolution of ρ and the #-v k s are known, we can use ρ(t) to get probabilities ( §7) and the #-v k (t)s to determine pathlines (showing that particles follow Bohmian trajectories).
The equation of motion for the theory (3.7) treats the collection of worlds as a continuum.
It fails to be a fundamental law since it does not describe the precise evolution of each world and is not valid if there are two few worlds to be well-described as a continuum. Deviations from standard quantum mechanical should be expected due to the fact that there are only a finite number of worlds; worse the fewer worlds there are. Future experiments may observe such deviations and support Newtonian QM. However, as textbook quantum mechanics works well, we have reason to believe there are a very large number of worlds. Ultimately, the inter-world quantum potential energy term, Q, should be derivable from a more fundamental inter-world interaction which would apply cleanly to cases in which there are just a handful of worlds.
Hopefully future research will explain how the continuum approximation arises from a "microdynamics" of worlds just as fluid dynamics arises from the micro-dynamics of molecules. For some progress in this direction, see Hall et al. (2014) .
In the previous section we showed that for any wave function Ψ(t) obeying the Schrödinger equation, there exists a world-density ρ(t) and a collection of velocity fields #-v k (t) obeying (3.7)
such that the relations between Ψ, ρ, and the #-v k s expressed in (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied at all times. The converse does not hold. There are some combinations of ρ and the #-v k s, that is, 7 Pathlines are defined as sequences of positions #-z (t) such that at every time
gives the trajectory of a particle always traveling at the mean velocity #-u .
some ways the universe might be according to Newtonian QM, that do not correspond to any wave function. In general, we'll restrict our attention to combinations of ρ and the #-v k s that can be derived from a wave function via (2.1) and (2.2) as it is these states which reproduce the predictions of quantum physics. For such states, it may be useful to introduce a wave function Ψ even though it is not a fundamental entity and does not appear in the equation of motion of the theory (3.7). Ψ serves as a convenient way of summarizing information about the positions and velocities of particles in the various worlds; the magnitude encodes the density of worlds (2.1) and the phase encodes the velocities of particles (3.2).
As was just mentioned, there are some states of the universe in Newtonian QM that do not correspond to quantum wave functions. (This point is made concisely by Wallstrom (1994) in the context of Madelung hydrodynamics; it was noted earlier by Takabayasi (1952) ; see also Holland (2005, eq. 4.14) .) That is, there are some combinations of ρ and the #-v k s for which one cannot find a wave function Ψ which satisfies (2.1) and (2.2). The amplitude of Ψ follows straightforwardly from ρ, but not every set of velocity fields #-v k can be expressed as m k times the gradient of a phase (3.2). For this to be the case, we must impose a constraint on the velocity fields.
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Quantization Condition Integrating the momenta of the particles along any closed loop in configuration space gives a multiple of Planck's constant, h = 2π .
If the Quantization Condition is satisfied initially, (3.7) ensures that it will be satisfied at all times.
To see one sort of constraint this requirement imposes, think about the following case: a single electron orbiting a hydrogen nucleus in the n = 2, l = 1, m = 1 energy eigenstate.
For simplicity, take the nucleus to provide an external potential and pretend the universe just contains many worlds with a single electron in each. The electron's wave function is
where a is the Bohr radius. The guidance equation tells us that the particle in each world executes a circle around the z-axis with velocity v φ = mrsinθ , entirely in the φ direction (here φ is the azimuthal angle). (4.1) is trivially satisfied since m mrsinθ × 2πrsinθ = h. But, if the electrons were circling the z-axis a bit faster or a bit slower, the integral wouldn't turn out right and (4.1) wouldn't be satisfied; they could orbit twice as fast but not 1.5 times as fast.
Without the Quantization Condition, Newtonian QM has too large a space of states. There are ways the universe might be that are quantum mechanical and others that are not. It is easy to specify what universes should be excluded, those that violate (4.1), but it is hard to give a principled reason why those states should be counted as un-physical, improbable, or otherwise ignorable. For now, I think it is best to understand the Quantization Condition as an empirically discovered feature of the current state of the universe, or equivalently, of the initial conditions. However, a better explanation of its satisfaction would help strengthen Newtonian QM as it might seem that the best possible explanation of the condition's satisfaction is the existence of a wave function (backtracking to Prodigal QM). In the remainder of the article I will assume that the Quantization Condition is satisfied.
Since one can introduce a wave function to describe the world density and the velocity fields, one is free to use well-known techniques to calculate the time evolution of the wave function and then determine how the world density and velocity fields evolve. However, there is evidence that it is sometimes easier to use the trajectories of worlds to calculate the time evolution (Wyatt, 2005; Hall et al. , 2014) .
Probability: Versus Everettian Quantum Mechanics
The Born Rule is easier to justify in Newtonian QM than in the many-worlds interpretation.
In Everettian QM, there is dispute over how one can even make sense of assigning probabilities to measurement outcomes when the way the universe will branch is deterministic and known (sometimes called the incoherence problem). There is also the quantitative problem of why the Born Rule probabilities are the right ones to assign. Current derivations tend to appeal to complex decision-theoretic arguments (Deutsch, 1999; Greaves, 2004; Wallace, 2010) , which, although they may ultimately be successful, are not uncontroversially accepted (Baker, 2007; Albert, 2010; Price, 2010) . Things look worrisome because there are some prima facie plausible ways of counting agents which yield the result that the vast majority of agents see relative frequencies of experimental outcomes which deviate significantly from those predicted by the Born Rule (although the total weight of the branches in which agents see anomalous statistics is small). Newtonian QM does not run into similar problems since the number of worlds in a particular region of configuration space is always proportional to |Ψ| 2 . At any time, most agents are in high amplitude regions. So, in typical measurement scenarios, most agents will see long-run frequencies which agree with the predictions of the Born Rule. There is no reason to expect a quantitative probability problem for Newtonian QM.
Were a proponent of Prodigal QM to claim similar advantages over Everettian QM, one could reasonably object that the Born Rule is recovered only because it was put in by hand.
In Prodigal QM, (2.1) is an additional postulate. In Newtonian QM, it is not. The density of worlds is given by |Ψ| 2 because Ψ is definitionally related to the density of worlds by (2.1) (and (2.2)). The wave function is, after all, not fundamental but a mere description of ρ and #-v k .
Although it is widely agreed that the Born Rule can be justified in Bohmian mechanics, there is disagreement about how exactly the story should go. In this section I will briefly discuss In Bohmian mechanics, not all initial conditions reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. That is, not all specifications of the initial wave function Ψ(0) and particle con-
..) yield a universe in which experimenters would see long-run statistics of measurements on subsystems which agree with the predictions of the Born Rule. Why should we expect to be in one of the universes with Born Rule statistics? One way to respond to this problem is to add a postulate to the theory which ensures that ensembles of particles in the universe will (or almost certainly will) display Born Rule statistics upon measurement (e.g., Holland, 1993, §3.6.3) . A second option is to argue that typical universes are such that Born Rule frequencies will be observed when measurements are made (Dürr et al. , 1992) . To say that such results are "typically" observed is to say that: for any initial wave function Ψ(0), the vast majority of initial particle configurations reproduce Born Rule statistics. Speaking of the "vast majority" of initial configurations only makes sense relative to a way of measuring the size of regions of configuration space; here the measure used is given by |Ψ| 2 . A third option: one could argue that many initial states will start to display Born Rule statistics sufficiently rapidly that, since we are not at the beginning of the universe, we should expect to see Born Rule frequencies now even if such frequencies were not displayed in the distant past (Valentini & Westman, 2005) .
Each of these proposals faces challenges. The additional postulates which might be added to the theory look ad hoc. The measure used to determine typicality must be satisfactorily justified. 9 The desirable evolution of states described in the third option has, at best, only been demonstrated in relatively simple cases. Also, there will certainly exist initial conditions that do not come to display Born Rule statistics sufficiently rapidly and these must somehow be excluded. To the extent that one finds these objections to Bohmian strategies worrisome, it is an advantage of the new theory that it avoids them. given the state of the universe, one is generally uncertain which of the many distinct worlds one is in. There will always be many possibilities consistent with one's immediate experiences.
The uncertainty present here is self-locating uncertainty (see Lewis, 1979) . Of course, there will generally also be uncertainty about the state of the universe.
On to the quantitative problem: 10 Given a particular distribution of worlds ρ and velocity fields #-v k , that is, given a specification of the universe, one ought to assign equal credence to being in any of the worlds consistent with one's evidence. 11 This basic indifference principle suffices to derive the correct quantum probabilities. Consider an idealized case in which the agent knows the world density and the velocity fields, and knows that there is an agent in each of these worlds having experiences indistinguishable from her own. In this case, the above indifference principle tells her to assign probabilities to being in different regions of configuration space in accordance with ρ. Since ρ = |Ψ| 2 , she must assign credences in accordance with |Ψ| 2 and thus in agreement with the Born Rule. Next, suppose this agent learns the outcome of an experiment. Then she ought to assign zero credence to the worlds inconsistent with her evidence and reapportion that credence among those which remain (keeping the probability of each non-eliminated world equal). This updating is analogous to learning which branch you are on after a measurement in Everettian QM.
In general, the probability agent S ought to assign to her own world having property A, conditional on a particular state of the universe at a certain time, is Pr A ρ, #-v 1 , #-v 2 , ...) = # of worlds with property A and a copy of S # of worlds with a copy of S
Here A could be something like, "the pointer indicates 7" or "the particle just fired will hit in the third band of the interference pattern." V S delimits the set of worlds, specified by a region of configuration space, compatible with S's data. Worlds in this region are such that previous experiments had the outcomes S remembers them having, macroscopic arrangements 10 See also the discussion in Boström (2012, §2.4) . 11 This follows from a more general epistemic principle defended in Elga (2004) .
of particles match what S currently observes, etc. V AS gives the set of worlds compatible with S's data in which A holds. These conditional probabilities can be used to test hypotheses about ρ and the #-v k s and thus to learn about the state of the universe (not just one's own world) from experience.
12,13
8 Continuous Infinity or Mere Multitude of Worlds?
So far, we have taken ρ to describe the distribution of a large but finite number of worlds. But, one might be tempted to defend a variant of Newtonian QM in which there are a continuous infinity of worlds, one at every point at which ρ is non-zero. This causes trouble. The meaning of ρ becomes unclear if we move to a continuous infinity of worlds since we can no longer understand ρ as yielding the proportion of all worlds in a given volume of configuration space upon integration over that volume. There would be infinite worlds in any finite volume (where ρ = 0) and infinite total worlds. If ρ doesn't give the proportion of worlds in a region, it is unclear why epistemic agents should apportion credences as recommended in the previous section. So, the continuous variant, if sense can be made of it, faces the quantitative probability problem.
As discussed in §4, the dynamical law proposed for Newtonian QM (3.7) is not fundamental.
If it somehow turns out that we cannot view the force caused by the quantum potential as arising from an interaction between individual worlds, this would provide a reason to accept a continuous infinity of quantum worlds over a mere multitude. It might appear to be a strength of the continuous variant that its laws can already be precisely stated, but I expect that this advantage will evaporate when possible fundamental interactions are formulated for the discrete variant. The continuous variant does have one serious advantage: universes with too few worlds to behave quantum mechanically ( §4) are naturally forbidden.
Ontological Alternatives
There are a variety of ways to fill in the ontology of Newtonian QM. In this section I will provide some alternatives, leaving debate over the optimal ontology for another forum.
Option 1: World-particles in Configuration Space According to this picture, on the fundamental level, the universe is 3N dimensional and inhabited by a large number of point particles each of which has dynamics so complex that it merits the name of "world" or "worldparticle." Forces between these world-particles are Newtonian and the dynamics are local. Here
Newtonian QM is a theory of the Newtonian dynamics of a fluid of world-particles in 3N di-12 For simplicity, I have neglected the possibility that S's memories or current observations are deceptive. Things are as they appear to her and were as she remembers them to have been. I also assume that there is at most a single experientially identical copy of S in each world. 13 Note that the boundaries of V S and V AS will often depend on ρ and the #-v k s.
mensional space. Albert (1996) has argued that the one world of Bohmian mechanics can be understood as a world-particle which moves around in configuration space guided by the wave function. He provides a way of explaining how the appearance of a three-dimensional world arises from the motion of this world-particle which applies mutatis mutandis to Newtonian QM in which there are more world-particles executing the same old Bohmian dances.
Option 2: World-particles in Configuration Space AND 3D Worlds Inspired by Dorr (2009), one could argue that there is a 3N dimensional space in which world-particles interact locally through Newtonian forces, but add something to the ontology. For each world-particle in configuration space, there exists a corresponding 3 dimensional world where the point particles are arranged in that precise configuration. As the world-particle moves through configuration space, the particles in the associated 3 dimensional world rearrange themselves accordingly. One might prefer to think of these 3D worlds as being located at the appropriate point in configuration space or to think of them as entirely separate spaces. As compared with the last proposal this alternative incurs the cost of positing additional, potentially unnecessary, stuff but gains the benefit of a more straightforward explanation of the 3 dimensional appearance of our world.
Option 3: Distinct 3D Worlds One can generate a variant of option 2 by removing the configuration space and the world particles, leaving the universe to contain a large number of interacting but entirely disjoint 3 dimensional worlds. This universe is more ontologically parsimonious than that posited in option 2 but the interaction between spatiotemporally isolated worlds is metaphysically odd. First, it appears to require causal connection between spatiotemporally isolated worlds. Second, to have these isolated worlds interact via (3.7) there would have to be a way of identifying spacetime points between the worlds. Alternatively, the next option offers the possibility of having the different 3 dimensional worlds inhabit the very same 3 dimensional space.
Option 4: Overlapping 3D Worlds Finally, drawing on Allori et al. (2011) , I offer an ontology in which the universe contains only particles interacting in a single 3 dimensional space. According to this story, there are particles all over the place, but two particles nearby may not be members of the same world. Some particles are members of world #1, some of world #2, etc. What world a particle belongs too might be a primitive property, like its mass or charge. The equation of motion for a particle in world #827, (3.7), says that the force from the potential V depends only on the positions of the other particles in world #827. However, the quantum potential introduces an inter-world force whereby particles that are not members of world #827 can still impact the trajectory of a particle in this world. So, particles which happen to be members of the same world interact in one way, whereas particles which are members of different worlds interact another way. With this ontology, Newtonian QM would be a non-local theory, but the entire universe would live in a single 3 dimensional space. Figure 9 .1 depicts the four ontological options just discussed. For ease of illustration, the alternatives are applied to the case of two particles in 1 dimensional space. The first option is to have the ontology consist of a 2 dimensional space occupied by a collection of point particles.
According to option 2, there are also 1 dimensional worlds where particles are arranged as specified by the dots in configuration space. For simplicity, only two of the worlds are shown for options 2-4. Option 3 just contains the 1 dimensional worlds of option 2. In the fourth option all of the particles occupy the same 1 dimensional space, but different particles belong to different worlds. Figure 9 .1: Ontological alternatives for two particles in one dimensional space.
In the many-worlds interpretation, one must tell a somewhat complicated story about how people and quantum worlds arise as emergent entities in the time-evolving quantum state (e.g., Wallace, 2003) . This story may not be successful. It might be the case that wave functions evolving in accordance with the Schrödinger equation are incapable of supporting life or at least lives that feel like ours (Maudlin, 2010) . If that's right, Newtonian QM has a potential advantage. On ontological options 2, 3, and 4, people are built from particles in the usual way.
On ontological option 1, there is a story about emergence that must be told but the details of the story are very different from the Everettian one and it succeeds or fails independently.
If, on the other hand, the Everettian story about emergence is successful, then Bohmian mechanics (as formulated here) faces the Everett-in-denial objection (Deutsch, 1996; Brown & Wallace, 2005; Valentini, 2010) Specifying the wave function Ψ at a time uniquely determines ρ and the #-v k s by (2.1) and (2.2).
Do ρ and the #-v k s at a time determine Ψ? 14,15 First consider the case where ρ is everywhere nonzero. The magnitude of Ψ can be derived from (2.1), and (3.2) gives the phase up to a global constant. The wave function can be determined up to a global phase. This would be insufficient if the overall phase mattered, but as the global phase is arbitrary this gives exactly what we need. Actually, it's even better this way. The fact that the dynamics don't care about the overall phase is explained in Newtonian QM by the fact that changes in the global phase of the wave function don't change the state of the universe; that is, they don't change ρ or the #-v k s.
If the region in which ρ = 0 is not connected, the wave function is not uniquely determined by ρ and the #-v k s as one can introduce arbitrary phase differences between the separate regions. As an example of the breakdown of uniqueness, consider the second energy eigenstate of a particle in a 1 dimensional infinite square well of length L. In this case the wave function is
This describes a universe with ρ and #-v given by
The velocity field #-v is undefined where there are no worlds. These expressions for ρ and #-v are also compatible with (10.4) 14 Here the question is considered at the level of the continuum description. Because there are multiple ways of coarse-graining, there will be multiple not-too-different ρs and #-v k s that well-describe any finite collection of worlds and thus many wave functions. It may be that some ways of coarse-graining avoid the problems raised in this section by ensuring that the velocity fields are always well-defined. If they do, the derivability of Ψ from ρ and the #-v k s comes at the cost of limiting the wave functions one can recover, losing those in (4.2), (10.1), (10.3),
and (10.4).
15 See also the discussion in Holland (2005, §4) . 16 The wave function ψ b has the disreputable property of not being smooth. It should be noted that there exist pairs of distinct smooth non-analytic wave functions which agree on ρ and #-v at a time. (Thanks to Gordon Belot for suggesting an example like this.) For example,
As ψ a and ψ b evolve via the Schrödinger equation, they will dictate different evolutions for ρ and #-v both compatible with the equations which characterize the dynamics of Newtonian QM, (3.4) and (3.7). However, ψ b 's evolution is clearly the more pathological as a state where all the particles are initially at rest and experiencing no forces evolves quickly into one where particles are moving. The indeterminacy in how the state will evolve occurs because ρ is zero and the velocity field is undefined at L/2, so ∂ρ ∂t and #-a are undefined at L/2. The future evolution of the universe is not uniquely determined by the instantaneous state (10.2) and the dynamical equations of Newtonian QM. However I expect that, in ordinary cases, giving the history of the world density and the velocity fields for a finite interval of time will be sufficient for determining the wave function and the future evolution of ρ and the #-v k s.
Consider a slightly different problem from that posed at the beginning of the section: Suppose one would would like to find a wave function which describes a history of ρ(t) and the #-v k (t)s, satisfying (3.4) and (3.7) over some time interval. There will be a collection of wave functions which satisfy (2.1) and (2.2) at each time. For any such wave function, one can multiply it by a spatially homogeneous time-dependent phase factor, e if (t) , to get another wave function which always satisfies (2.1) and (2.2). In general, some of these wave functions will satisfy the Schrödinger equation (1.1) and others will not. To constrain the time-dependence of the phase when using a wave function to describe histories, (3.5) should be imposed as a third link between the wave function and the fundamental ontology (in addition to (2.1) and (2.2)). Because (2.1), (2.2), (3.4), and (3.5) hold, the wave function must obey the Schrödinger equation.
Symmetries: Time Reversal and Galilean Boosts
Newtonian QM has an unexpected payoff: it helps us understand symmetry transformations in non-relativistic QM. Here I will discuss time reversal and Galilean boosts. First, time reversal.
Albert (2000) proposes an intuitive and general account of time reversal symmetry in physical theories which judges QM, in all of its familiar precisifications, to fail to be time-reversal invariant. According to Albert's account, as it applies to deterministic laws, a physical theory specifies what sequences of instantaneous states are allowed and which are forbidden through a dynamical equation of motion. If the laws allow the time-reversed history of instantaneous states for any allowed history of instantaneous states, then the theory is deemed time-reversal invariant. In theories like Bohmian mechanics or Everettian QM, the instantaneous state includes the wave function at a time Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) and a complete history includes the wave function at all times. The time reverse of the history is Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., −t). Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., −t) will not necessarily satisfy the Schrödinger equation whenever Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) does, so QM is judged not to be time-reversal invariant. However, Ψ * ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., −t) will always satisfy the Schrödinger equation whenever Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) does.
In Newtonian QM, it is straightforward to show that time reversing the history of parti-cle trajectories amounts to changing the history of the wave function from Ψ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) to
.., −t). The instantaneous state of the world is specified by giving the locations (but not the velocities) of all of the particles in all of the worlds. The time reversal operation thus takes the history ρ( #-x 1 , #-x 2 , ..., t) and
Since the time-reversal operation flips all of the velocities, (3.2) ensures that it flips the complex phase of the wave function. The complex conjugation in the time reversal operation for QM can be explained as deriving from a reversal in the velocities of the particles.
Newtonian QM is time-reversal invariant according to Albert's account. Even if one doesn't agree with Albert's account of time-reversal invariance (I've given you no reason to), it is a virtue of this theory over others that it can give a simple explanation of why the wave function transforms in the textbook way under time-reversal.
Next, Galilean boosts. In a similar spirit to Albert's criticism of the standard account of time-reversal, one could argue that QM is not really invariant under Galilean boosts since the equations of motion are not generally obeyed when we take Ψ( #-
t).
17 The invariance of QM under Galilean boosts is sometimes demonstrated by showing that, for certain potentials, there exists a transformation of the state which appropriately shifts the probability density and guarantees satisfaction of the Schrödinger equation (e.g., Ballentine, 1998, §4.3) . Under a boost by #-w, the wave function is supposed to transform as
t) .
(11.1)
It's interesting that there exists a transformation which moves probability densities in the right way and guarantees that the Schrödinger equation is invariant under boosts, but it is unclear why this particular transformation is the one that really represents Galilean boosts. In Newtonian QM this transformation of the wave function results from boosting the velocities of all of the particles in all of the worlds.
Adding #-w to the velocity of each particle transforms the original density ρ 0 (t) and the original velocity fields #-v 0k (t) to
Suppose Ψ 0 (t), ρ 0 (t), and the #-v 0k (t)s satisfy (2.1), (2.2), and (3.5); that is, Ψ 0 (t) describes this density and these velocity fields. Then, the new wave function Ψ(t) generated by the transformation in (11.1) will satisfy (2.1), (2.2), and (3.5) for the ρ(t) and #-v k (t)s in (11.2), provided that the potential V is translation invariant (as the reader can verify). Thus, (11.1)
gives a general recipe for finding a wave function which correctly describes the boosted particles.
17 A point made by Albert in presentations.
An optimistic synopsis: Once we realize that Newtonian QM is a viable way of understanding non-relativistic quantum mechanics, we see that we never needed to overthrow Newtonian mechanics with a quantum revolution. One can formulate quantum mechanics in terms of point particles interacting via purely Newtonian forces. The mysterious wave function is merely a way of summarizing the properties of particles, not a piece of fundamental reality.
There are a variety of reasons not to like this theory. First, there is arguably a cost associated with the abundance of other worlds which, although they are detectable via their interactions with our own world, are admittedly odd. Second, the space of states for the theory is larger than one might like in two distinct ways ( §4): There are possible combinations of ρ and the #-v k s that do not correspond to any wave function because the velocity fields cannot be expressed as the gradient of a phase. There are states where the number of worlds is not sufficiently large for the continuum description to be valid. Third, even when the number of worlds is fairly large, it is a shortcoming of the current formulation of Newtonian QM that we must approximate the distribution as continuous and cannot yet formulate the fundamental equation of motion precisely for a discrete collection of worlds ( §4). Finally, the theory is limited in that it is not here extended to systems of multiple particles with spin or to relativistic quantum physics.
In addition to its seductive conservatism, I view the following comparative strengths as most compelling. Against the many-worlds interpretation, Newtonian QM has two main advantages.
First, there is no incoherence problem or quantitative probability problem as the Born Rule can be justified quickly from self-locating uncertainty ( §5). Second, the theory avoids the need to explain how worlds emerge from the wave function as worlds are taken to be fundamental ( §9).
Compared to Bohmian mechanics, the theory is arguably simpler as it replaces an ontology of wave functions and particles with one just containing particles ( §3). Newtonian QM's explanation of why we should expect our world to reproduce Born Rule statistics is potentially more compelling than the Bohmian stories ( §6). Also, Newtonian QM is forthright about its many worlds character, sidestepping the Everett-in-denial objection ( §9). which is similar to (3.1). Here the z-spin basis is used to represent the spinor.
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The Bohmian guidance equation for a spin-1/2 particle is 
using the Einstein summation convention over spatial index a. 19 The right hand side gives the net torque on the particle, which arises from a quantum and a classical contribution. These torques can be combined by defining This is simply the equation of motion for a particle without spin (3.7) with two new terms:
the classical force on a particle with magnetic moment #-µ from a magnetic field #-B Tot and a spin-dependent contribution to the quantum potential,
As with the quantum potential Q discussed in §3, this new term represents an interaction between worlds (as does the spin-dependent contribution to the net magnetic field #-B Tot ). Together, the above equations of motion for #-µ and #-v , (A.7) and (A.9), serve to define Newtonian QM for a single spin-1/2 particle. We can omit any mention of the spinor wave function χ or the phase θ in the fundamental laws. The equations of motion for #-µ and #-v , which govern the evolution of ρ via (3.4), will guarantee that ρ, #-µ , and #-v will evolve as if they were governed by a spinor wave function satisfying the Pauli equation, provided that the velocity field obeys a constraint like the one imposed for spin-0 particles in §4,
A.2 Stern-Gerlach Experiments
In Newtonian QM, in each world the particle has a well-defined direction of spin at all times.
How can the theory recover the results of standard experiments involving spin if particles are never in superpositions of different spin states?
Consider what happens when a single particle in the .12) spin state is passed through a z-spin "measuring" Stern-Gerlach apparatus. On the standard account, a particle in state | is in a superposition of being z-spin up and z-spin down. When passed through an inhomogeneous magnetic field, the wave function will split in two, a larger part deflected upwards and a smaller part deflected downwards. Upon measurement, the particle will be found in either the upper region or the lower region with probabilities of 75% and 25%, repectively.
In Newtonian QM, there is initially an ensemble of worlds, in each of which the particle has some initial position in the wave packet and in all of which the particle's spin magnetic moment points in the same direction (α = π packet has its spin rotated to ↑ z as it passes through the Stern-Gerlach apparatus (in accordance with (A.7)). Similarly, a particle in the lower portion will end up with spin ↓ z . In this theory, the Stern-Gerlach apparatus does not measure z-spin, but instead forces particles to align their magnetic moments along the z-axis. 20 The particle trajectories and evolving spins are plotted in figure A.1. 20 This is also how Stern-Gerlach measurements are interpreted in versions of Bohmian mechanics where particles have definite spins (see Dewdney et al. , 1986; Holland, 1993, ch. 9 ).
